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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Sasha Martinez argues on appeal that the district court violated her constitutional
rights, afforded by both the Sixth and Fourteenth amendments, to confront and crossexamine her co-defendant, Luis Espinoza, when the prosecutor read Mr. Espinoza's
statement to police into the record at Ms. Martinez's sentencing hearing.

She also

asserts that the district court abused its discretion by unreasonably prohibiting her from
presenting evidence, both at her sentencing hearing and at the hearing on her I.C.R. 35
(hereinafter, Rule 35) motion.

Finally, she contends that, should all those errors be

deemed individually harmless, cumulatively, they deprived her of due process
throughout the criminal prosecution.
The State's responses are, for the most part, not applicable to the claims
Ms. Martinez raised. For example, its response to her claim that her Sixth Amendment
rights were violated was premised on two cases, the analysis of which predated the
watershed United States Supreme Court decision in Crawford v. Washington, 541
U.S. 36 (2006).

Crawfords overhaul of the analysis under the Sixth Amendment

essentially abrogated the cases upon which the State tries to rely. Similarly, the State's
arguments as to the Fourteenth Amendment right to confrontation at sentencing ignores
precedent on point and relies on a misinterpretation of the dated precedent upon which
it relies.
Furthermore, the State's only argument in regard to Ms. Martinez's assertion that
the district court unreasonably restricted the evidence it considered at her sentencing
hearing is based on a procedural requirement established by the Idaho Supreme Court
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in regard to motions to reopen a hearing.

However, when Ms. Martinez was

unreasonably denied the opportunity to present evidence at her sentencing hearing,
the evidentiary period had not yet closed and, therefore, the State's argument is not
applicable to Ms. Martinez's case. This theme continues with the State's contentions
regarding the district court's unreasonable rejection of evidence at the Rule 35 hearing.
The State cites precedent which dealt with the district court's initial decision to hold a
hearing on a Rule 35 motion. However, the State ignores the precedent which holds
that once the district court decides to have a hearing, as it did in this case, it cannot
prohibit the presentation of evidence in support of that motion.
Finally, in regard to the cumulative error doctrine, the State again ignores
precedent demonstrating the right which the cumulative error doctrine protects extends
to all hearings in the criminal prosecution, which includes sentencing hearings and
hearings on motions for leniency. The State also misinterprets precedent and tries and
claim that Ms. Martinez had no due process rights during her Rule 35 hearing, when the
precedent it relied upon only addressed the initial determination of whether a hearing
was necessary.
The State's arguments, mostly inapplicable to the issues presented on appeal
and based on misinterpretations of precedent, do not undermine Ms. Martinez's claims.
The district court did not afford Ms. Martinez her constitutional rights to confront an
adverse witness. It unreasonably restricted the evidence it considered in regard to its
determination on sentencing. It admitted on the record that it would not accept any new
evidence in support of Ms. Martinez's Rule 35 motion, directly contrary to precedent.
And even if each and everyone of those errors were found individually harmless,
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cumulatively, they reveal that the criminal prosecution of Ms. Martinez was lacking in
fundamental fairness.

For any or all of those reasons, this Court should vacate her

sentence and remand her case for further proceedings.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated
in Ms. Martinez's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but
are incorporated herein by reference thereto.

3

ISSUES
1.

Whether the district court erroneously permitted Mr. Espinoza's statement to be
read into the record without affording Ms. Martinez the opportunity to confront
Mr. Espinoza or present rebuttal evidence.

2.

Whether the district court abused its discretion by improperly limiting the
evidence available, both at the sentencing hearing and the Rule 35 hearing.

3.

Whether the district court's numerous errors entitle Ms. Martinez to relief
pursuant to the cumulative error doctrine.
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ARGUMENT
I.

The District Court Erroneously Permitted Mr. Espinoza's Statement To Be Read
Into The Record Without Affording Ms. Martinez The Opportunity To Confront
Mr. Espinoza Or Present Rebuttal Evidence

A.

Introduction
Ms. Martinez argues that there are two constitutional provisions which guarantee

the right to confrontation at sentencing - the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause
and the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.

In regard to the Sixth

Amendment's protections, the only cases the State cites predate the watershed
decision from the United States Supreme Court which redefined the analysis applicable
to the Confrontation Clause - Crawford v. Washington. The authority upon which the
State relies applied the old analysis, and thus were abrogated by Crawford and its
progeny. In fact, the State is arguing that the very evil Crawford sought to prevent - the
use of ex parte examinations of a witness as evidence against the defendant - should
be allowed by the Idaho courts.

Application of the proper analysis reveals that the

State's argument is erroneous and should be rejected.
In regard to the Fourteenth Amendment's protections, the State relies on a
misinterpretation of one case. Additionally, the State fails to respond to the analysis
Ms. Martinez provided on that point. A proper reading of precedent, when applied to
Ms. Martinez's case, reveals that the Fourteenth Amendment's protections extend to
her.
In regard to either of these constitutional protections, the district court violated
Ms. Martinez's constitutional rights when it allowed the State to read Mr. Espinoza's
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out-of-court, testimonial statements into the record without providing Ms. Martinez an
opportunity to confront and cross-examine him about those statements.

B.

The District Court Violated Ms. Martinez's Sixth Amendment Right To Confront
The Witness Against Her
The State's only response to Ms. Martinez's arguments concerning the Sixth

Amendment right to confrontation is to point to two Idaho decisions, one from 1986 and
the other from 1991. (Resp. Br., p.5 (referring to Sivakv. State, 112 Idaho 197 (1986),
and State v. Wolverton, 120 Idaho 559 (Ct. App. 1991).)

Both of those cases

concerning the right to confrontation at sentencing were based on the fact that the
defendant could still challenge the reliability of hearsay statements introduced
at sentencing without cross-examining the declarant.

See Sivak, 112 Idaho at 215

("[The defendant] need not have the actual live witnesses whose statements are
contained in the report present at the sentencing hearing so long as he is afforded the

opportunity to explain and to argue the veracity of those statements before the
sentencing judge.") (emphasis added); Wolverton,

120 Idaho at 563 ("Hearsay

information in a report must be disregarded if there is no reasonable basis to deem the

information reliable or if the information is the product of conjecture or speculation.")
(emphasis added).
However, the State ignores the watershed decision from the United States
Supreme Court in 2004 - Crawford v. Washington - which redefined the entire
framework for discussing and analyzing the right bestowed by the Confrontation Clause.
As a result, earlier cases (such as Sivak and Wolverton), which relied on the
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now-outdated analysis, are no longer controlling as to the scope and application of the
Confrontation Clause's protections.
In fact, the "principle evil at which the Confrontation Clause was directed was the
civil-law mode of criminal procedure, and particularly its use of ex parte examinations as
evidence against the accused."1 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50; see id. at 44-46 (discussing
the trial of Sir Walter Raleigh as an example of a violation of the Confrontation Clause
because the court allowed consideration of the written statement of Raleigh's codefendant without allowing Raleigh to subject that person to cross-examination).
Nevertheless, that is exactly what the State proffered as evidence in this case - an
ex parte statement produced during a custodial examination.

See id. at 50;

State v. Hooper, 145 Idaho 139, 143 (2007) (recognizing that such statements are
classified as one of the "core" formulations of testimonial statements invoking the
protection of the Confrontation Clause). The admission of that evidence without allowing
for confrontation in this case, a modern-day equivalent of the Raleigh case, violated
Ms. Martinez's rights under the Confrontation Clause.
Therefore, since it is clear post-Crawford that Mr. Espinoza's statements, made
while he was in custody, are inadmissible testimonial statements, the only question
remaining is whether Crawford's protections extend to sentencing hearings. As in
Crawford, this analysis begins with a return to the Amendment itself, which provides that

1 Essentially, the point of the Confrontation Clause is to prevent a defendant from being
subjected to trial and punishment based upon the unchallenged statements of a
co-defendant, which was made to police out of court. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 63-64.
Ms. Martinez was subjected to punishment based on the unchallenged statements
of her co-defendant, Mr. Espinoza, which were made out of court. (See Tr., p.53,
L.21 - p.54, L.4.)
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"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with
the witnesses against him." U.S. CONST. amend VI. The term "criminal prosecution"
has, and continues to refer to all stages of the prosecution process, which includes
sentencing. See, e.g., 4 W. BLACKSTONE COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 288,
288-406 (1765-1769) at 375, 406 (identifying judgment and punishment as one of the
final stages of the criminal prosecution); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972)
(holding that defendants at probation revocations do not get the full panoply of rights
because the probation revocation occurs after "the end of the criminal prosecution,
including imposition of sentence"). Therefore, because sentencing determinations are
part of the criminal prosecution, the protections granted by the Confrontation Clause
extend to those hearings as well. 2 As that right was violated by the district court's
decision to not allow Ms. Martinez the opportunity to cross-examine Mr. Espinoza
(see generally Tr., pp.53-54), this Court should vacate her sentence and remand her
case for a new sentencing hearing.

C.

The District Court Violated Ms. Martinez's Federal Constitutional Rights To Due
Process By Denying Her The Opportunity To Confront The Witness Against Her
Even if the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation does not apply at sentencing,

Ms. Martinez also had a right to due process at her sentencing hearing. State v. Coutts,
101 Idaho 110, 117 n.1 0 (1980) ("It is now clear that the sentencing process, as well as
the trial itself, must satisfy the requirements of the Due Process Clause.") (quoting

This is particularly important in the era of plea agreements, as the sentencing hearing
provides the only opportunity for the State to present its evidence and for the defendant
to exercise her constitutional rights in regard to that evidence. (See App. Br., at 8,
8 n.2.)
2
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Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358 (1977)). Both the United States Supreme Court
and the Idaho Supreme Court have recognized that "the right to confront and
cross-examine witnesses is a fundamental aspect of procedural due process."
Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 428-29 (1969); State v. Rose, 144 Idaho 762, 767
(2007) (recognizing confrontation is an aspect of due process, specifically during a
probation revocation hearing); State v. Reid, 151 Idaho 80, 90 (Ct. App. 2011)
(recognizing that the due process right to confront witnesses would extend to
sentencing hearings where the defendant makes a showing that the challenged
information is materially untrue).3 That right may be limited in the sentencing hearings
or subsequent hearings (such as probation revocation) where there are "earmarks of
reliability" in the statements proffered. 4

Rose, 144 Idaho at 767 (quoting Young v.

United States, 863 A2d 804, 808 (D.C. 2004) (in turn quoting Morrissey, 408 U.S. at
481 )).

However, the statement proffered in this case, that of a co-defendant, is

inherently unreliable because of the co-defendant's inherent motives to lie, meaning that
the defendant needs to be able to cross examine in regard to such statements in order
to satisfy the requirements of due process. See State v. Johnson, 101 Idaho 581, 584
(1980); State v. Stone, 147 Idaho 890,891 (2009); Matthews v. State, 136 Idaho 46,49
(Ct. App. 2001).

3 A difficult task, if the defendant is barred from presenting rebuttal evidence against the
statements, as happened in this case. (Tr., p.54, L.13 - p.57, L.13.)
4 Because this right is derived from the Fourteenth Amendment, as opposed to the Sixth
Amendment, this right to confrontation is independent from the right discussed in
Crawford. As such, there is no issue regarding the ability to limit the due process right
based on reliability of the statement, a concern related to the Sixth Amendment itself.
See, e.g., Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68-69. And, as the Idaho Supreme Court recognized,
numerous other jurisdictions have recognized this independent due process right to
confrontation. Rose, 144 Idaho at 767-68.
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The State makes two points in regard to this issue. First, it contends that "due
process is satisfied when the defendant has the opportunity to address statements in
the PSI." (Resp. Br. at 6.) However, it does not cite any authority for that argument.
As such, it should be disregarded, particularly since it is an over-simplistic statement of
the law. Due process requires a "full opportunity" to address such information, which
consists of the opportunity "to present favorable evidence" as well as "to explain
and rebut adverse evidence."

See, e.g., State v. Morgan, 109 Idaho 1040, 1043

(Ct. App. 1985) (quoting State v. Moore, 93 Idaho 14, 17 (1969)); State v. Wheeler, 129
Idaho 735, 739 (Ct. App. 1997). That is what Ms. Martinez was trying to get from the
district court - a full opportunity to rebut adverse evidence and to present favorable
evidence:
[DEFENSE COUSNEL]: Again, Your Honor, I just want to make the same
argument. ... this person is not here. He could have been here, and then
I could cross-examine him.
I didn't know [the prosecutor] was going to go into a hearsay report and
talk about all these things, but I'm just telling you [one of the other people
involved in the crime] is here and would testify and clear a lot of those
facts up.
THE COURT: I'm not going to get into it now.
(Tr., p.53, Ls.21-24, p.57, Ls.9-13.)

As a result of the district court's decision,

Ms. Martinez was not afforded the full opportunity, particularly an opportunity to present
favorable evidence in response to the adverse evidence, as required by due process.
See Morgan, 109 Idaho at 1043; Moore, 93 Idaho at 17; Wheeler, 129 Idaho at 739.
Second, the State's only other contention in regard to the due process right to
confrontation is based on a misinterpretation of Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241,
250-51 (1949).

(Resp. Sr., at 5.)

The State asserts that Williams stands for the
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proposition that "[d]ue process likewise does not require live testimony subject to
cross-examination at sentencing."

(Resp. Br., at 5.) The Williams opinion does not

make such a holding, particularly in regard to the particular challenge presented in this
case:

whether due process requires the opportunity to cross-examine a declarant-

witness on an inherently unreliable statement presented at sentencing.

(See App.

Br., pp.10-13.)
Rather, the Williams Court was focused on the issue of whether the federal
constitution would prevent the district court from considering evidence at sentencing
which was provided in a "probation report" which "[drew] on information concerning
every aspect of the defendant's life," where that evidence was not presented via live
testimony subject to cross-examination. Williams, 337 U.S. at 250.

The Williams Court

described the probation report as a document which would contain information about
the defendant's:
(1) Offense; (2) Prior Record; (3) Family History; (4) Home and
Neighborhood; (5) Education; (6) Religion; (7) Interests and Activities;
(8) Health (physical and mental); (9) Employment; (10) Resources;
(11) Summary; (12) Plan; and (13) Agencies Interested. Each of the
headings is further broken down into sub-headings. The form represents a
framework into which information can be inserted to give the sentencing
judge a composite picture of the defendant.
Williams, 337 U.S. at 250 n.15.

Based on that description, the probation report

appears to be akin to Idaho's presentence investigation reports.

See id.

Hearsay

evidence may be presented in such documents, provided that the information is reliable.
State v. Mauro, 121 Idaho 178, 183 (1991); Reid, 151 Idaho at 88-89; see also
United States v. Petty, 982 F.2d 1365, 1369 (9th Cir. 1993). In order to assure that the

information is reliable, "the defendant is afforded the opportunity to present favorable
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evidence and to explain or rebut the adverse information." State v. Carey, 152 Idaho
720, 721 (Ct. App. 2012). That is essentially the same concern that the United States
Supreme Court had in Williams:
[Those] reports have been given a high value by conscientious judges
who want to sentence persons on the best evidence available rather than
on guess work and inadequate information . ... We must recognize that
most of the information now relied upon by judges to guide them in the
intelligent imposition of sentences would be unavailable if information
were restricted to that [evidence] given in open court by witnesses subject
to cross-examination .... The type and extent of this information make
totally impractical if not impossible open court testimony with crossexamination.
Williams, 337 U.S. at 250 (emphasis added).

Idaho has simply defined the

requirements necessary to ensure such information is adequate and reliable.
See Mauro, 121 Idaho at 183; Carey, 152 Idaho at 721; Rose, 144 Idaho at 767.
As such, the due process right to confrontation exists, though limited, post-Williams.
In fact, Williams is reconcilable with Rose and Reid - where the proffered statements
bear the earmarks of reliability, there is no due process requirement for crossexamination of the declarant-witness, but where the proffered statements do not bear
the earmarks of reliability, the defendant must be afforded the opportunity to crossexamine the declarant-witness.

Williams, 337 U.S. at 250; Rose, 144 Idaho at 767;

Reid, 151 Idaho at 90. In the case that cross-examination does not happen when such
cross-examination is necessary to ensure the proffered statement is reliable, the
defendant has been deprived of her constitutional right to due process.

Rose, 144

Idaho at 767; Reid, 151 Idaho at 90.
In this case, the proffered evidence is a co-defendant's statement made to police
during a custodial interrogation.

(See Tr., p.53, L.21 - p.54, L.5.) A co-defendant's
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statements are inherently unreliable because of the various motivations to lie.
See, e.g., Johnson, 101 Idaho at 584; Stone, 147 Idaho at 891; Matthews, 136 Idaho
at 49.

As such, Ms. Martinez needed to be able to cross-examine Mr. Espinoza to

ensure the evidence the district court considered was reliable.

See, e.g., Reid, 151

Idaho at 90. As that opportunity was denied her (Tr., p.53, L.21 - p.54, L.5), she has
been denied her constitutional rights to due process. See Rose, 144 Idaho at 767; Reid,
151 Idaho at 88-89.

II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Improperly Limiting The Evidence Available,
Both At The Sentencing Hearing And The Rule 35 Hearing

A.

Introduction
The district

court

improperly

restricted

the

evidence

presented

for

its

consideration at the sentencing hearing and at the subsequent Rule 35 hearing.
In regard to the sentencing hearing, the State's only argument for affirming the district
court's actions is that Ms. Martinez needed to show some reason for the district court to
reopen the evidentiary portion of that hearing.

The major problem with the State's

argument is that the evidentiary period had not yet closed when Ms. Martinez requested
the opportunity to rebut the evidence the State had read into the record and, therefore,
the procedural rule which the State advocates is inapplicable in this case. Because it
did not provide any argument as to the substance of Ms. Martinez's contentions, any
such argument should be deemed to be waived. Therefore, based on Ms. Martinez's
uncontested arguments, this Court should remedy the abuse of discretion caused by the
district court's unreasonable restriction of the evidence at the sentencing hearing.
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In regard to the Rule 35 hearing, the State asserts that there was no abuse of
discretion because no additional evidence need be considered when the defendant
moves for leniency pursuant to Rule 35, as the district court is authorized to rule on a
Rule 35 motion without a hearing. However, the Idaho Supreme Court has held exactly
opposite, requiring that, when moving for Rule 35 relief, the defendant present new or
additional evidence in support of that motion. The authorities to which the State cites
are inapplicable to Ms. Martinez's case because those opinions address whether the
district court needs to hold a hearing, not its decisions regarding the presentation of
evidence at a hearing it has decided to hold. The case law is clear that once it decides
to hold a hearing, the district court abuses its discretion if it unreasonably limits the
evidence proffered, particularly in light of the requirement that the defendant provide
new and additional evidence to support the motion.

Therefore, the district court's

unreasonable decision to not allow Ms. Martinez to present the new and additional
evidence in support of her motion was an abuse of discretion, and should be remedied.

B.

In Regard To The District Court's Unreasonable Restriction Of Presented
Evidence At The Sentencing Hearing. The State's Argument Regarding The
Limitations Established In Printcraft Are Inapplicable To Ms. Martinez's Case
Because She Was Not Moving To Reopen The Evidentiary Period Of That
Hearing
The State's only argument in regard to this issue is that, based on the recent

Idaho Supreme Court decision in Prinfcraft Press, Inc. v. Sunnyside Park Utilities, Inc.,
153 Idaho 440, 458-59 (2012), reh'g denied, Ms. Martinez would have needed to show
a reasonable excuse to have the district court reopen the hearing and accept new
evidence. That argument is inapplicable to Ms. Martinez's request to present evidence
at the sentencing hearing because she was not moving to reopen the sentencing
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hearing; she was requesting the opportunity to rebut the State's evidence before that
hearing closed. Basically, in order for the Printcraft rule to apply in a particular case, the
party moving to reopen the evidentiary period must have already rested its case and the
court entered a ruling (otherwise, there has been nothing closed, and so nothing to
reopen).5

See id. at 458 ("Printcraft rested its case in chief without presenting any

evidence in support of its claim .... the district court's decision was rendered on the
basis that Printcraft had rested its case without presenting evidence.")
However, the evidentiary period of Ms. Martinez's sentencing hearing had not
yet closed (i.e., counsel had not submitted the matter to the district court for its
decision), nor had the district court rendered its decision in regard to the imposition of
sentence when Ms. Martinez made her request to present Ms. Lopez's testimony.
(See generally Tr., pp. 57 -64.) Because the evidentiary period of that hearing was still

open (for example, Ms. Martinez had yet to be afforded the opportunity to make her
statements of allocution to the district court), Printcraffs restrictions on the presentation
of evidence do not apply. In fact, Ms. Martinez was attempting to rebut the evidence the
prosecutor had just finished presenting. (Tr., p.54, L.13 - p.57, L.13.)

5 It appears that the State only argued Printcraffs restriction in regard to the district
court's decision to prevent the additional presentation of evidence at sentencing.
(See Resp. Br., pp.6-12.) However, to the extent that it had tried to argue Printcraft
in regard to the district court's decision to prevent the presentation of evidence at the
Rule 35 hearing, Printcraft is inapplicable. Ms. Martinez's Rule 35 motion was a new
motion which has a requirement that the movant present new or additional evidence in
support of her motion. See, e.g., State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203 (2007).
Ms. Martinez requested the opportunity to do exactly that. (Tr. p.72, L.20 - p.73, L.8.)
As such, there was no motion to reopen in regard to the Rule 35 hearing, and thus,
Printcraft is inapplicable to that hearing as well.
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Additionally, the parties are not expected to preempt and present evidence on
every possible alternative argument the other party might argue; that is the purpose of
affording the first party to present evidence the opportunity of a rebuttal.
AI/en v. Phoenix Assur.

Co.,

See, e.g.,

12 Idaho 653, 88 P. 245, 248-49 (1906); cf

State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 60 (2011) (recognizing that a prosecutor may not

present evidence of post-Miranda silence unless the defendant has already testified and
that evidence is introduce to impeach the defendant's testimony); State v. Butcher, 137
Idaho 125, 133 (Ct. App. 2002) (holding that the testimony of a rebuttal witness could
properly be presented because of the arguments the defense made during its case-inchief, regardless of whether that testimony might have been presented during the
State's case-in-chief).
Therefore, because the district court refused to give Ms. Martinez that
opportunity, which is not subject to Printcraft, it unreasonably limited the evidence it
would consider in terms of sentencing. 6 That constitutes an abuse of its discretion,
which this Court should remedy.

C.

In Regard To The District Court's Unreasonable Restriction Of Presented
Evidence At The Rule 35 Hearing, Because The Defendant Must Present New
And Additional Evidence To Support A Rule 35 Motion, The District Court
Abused Its Discretion By Limiting The Presentation Of That Evidence Once It
Decides To Hold A Hearing
As with its arguments regarding the district court's unreasonable limitation of the

evidence at the sentencing hearing, the State does not address the substantive points

As the State provided no argument in regard to the substantive issue of the district
court's unreasonable limitation of its discretion, Ms. Martinez simply refers this Court
back to the uncontested arguments set forth in her Appellant's Brief in this regard.
(App. Br., pp.13-16).
6
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in Ms. Martinez's arguments on this issue, but bases its position entirely on an
inapplicable procedural point.

Therefore, any argument as to the substantive issues

should be deemed waived, and the uncontested points demonstrate an abuse of
discretion.
The State's argument on this issue focuses on a procedural restriction from

State v. Bayles, 131 Idaho 624, 626 (Ct. App. 1998). (Resp. Br., pp.10-11.) The State
misreads Bayles and asserts that, before testimony may be presented at a hearing
which the district court has already determined is necessary, the defendant must first
present an offer of proof so that the district court might determine whether that evidence
need be presented. (See Resp. Br., pp.11-12.) However, Bayles only requires that '''[a]
Rule 35 movant wishing to submit additional evidence should make an 'offer of proof' in

the motion itself or by an accompanying affidavit to enable the district judge to make a
reasoned decision on whether to hold an evidentiary hearing . . . .'"

Bayles, 131

Idaho at 626 (quoting State v. Fortin, 124 Idaho 323,328 (Ct. App. 1993)) (emphasis in
italics from original, emphasis in bold added). The question presented in both Bayles
and Fortin was whether the district court needed to hold a hearing. See id.; Fortin, 124
Idaho at 328.
However, as both Bayles and Fortin recognize, once the district court decides to
hold a hearing on a Rule 35 motion, it cannot unduly limit the relevant evidence
proffered for its consideration.

Id.; see also State v. Izaguirre, 145 Idaho 820, 824

(Ct. App. 2008). In addition, the Idaho Supreme Court recently made the law regarding
Rule 35 motions abundantly clear: "[w]hen presenting a Rule 35 motion, the defendant
must show that the sentence is excessive in light of new or additional information
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subsequently provided to the district court in support of the Rule 35 motion."

State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203 (2007).

Therefore, where the district court

decides to hold a hearing, it cannot prevent the defendant from presenting evidence in
support of her Rule 35 motion.
Because the district court decided to hold a hearing in this case (R., p.74), if the
district court unreasonably restricted the relevant evidence, it abused its discretion.

See, e.g., Bayles, 131 Idaho at 626; Izaguirre, 145 Idaho at 824.

In this case, the

district court's abuse of discretion is demonstrated in two ways. First, "[w]hen a judge
refuses to consider any additional information, he erroneously narrows the scope of his
own discretion."

State v. Bonaparte, 114 Idaho 577, 582 (Ct. App. 1988).

That is

exactly what the district court did in this case:
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:
[Ms. Martinez's] mother.

I have a witness I would

THE COURT: Well, this is not an evidentiary hearing.
hearing was held at the facility.

like to call,

The evidentiary

DEFENSE COUNSEL: All Right.
THE COURT: And I don't do a new evidentiary hearing.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Okay. You don't allow anything additional?
THE COURT: I do not.
(Tr., Vol. 1, p.72, L.22 - p.73, L.7 (emphasis added).) As evidenced by its statements on
the record, the district court refused to accept any additional information proffered at
the hearing on Ms. Martinez's Rule 35 motion, which is a clear abuse of discretion.

Bonaparte, 1214 Idaho at 582; Bayles, 131 Idaho at 626.
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Second, hearings on Rule 35 motions for lenience are governed by the same
standards as the original sentence. State v. Trent, 125 Idaho 251, 253 (Ct. App. 1994).
To that end, the evidence relevant to sentencing is "largely unlimited." State v. Leon,
142 Idaho 709 (2006); see also Brown, 121 Idaho at 391.

Therefore, as it is at

sentencing, the evidence relevant to a Rule 35 motion for leniency is largely unlimited.
See, e.g., State v. Findeisen, 119 Idaho 903, 905 (Ct. App. 1991) (indicating facts about
the defendant's good character is relevant to a decision in a Rule 35 motion for
leniency).

Therefore, even without the district court's outright statements which

demonstrate the abuse of its discretion, the fact that it refused to receive and consider
relevant evidence proffered in support of a Rule 35 motion shows the abuse of its
discretion. Bayles, 131 Idaho at 626; Izaguirre, 145 Idaho at 824.

III.
The District Court's Numerous Errors Entitle Ms. Martinez To Relief Pursuant To The
Cumulative Error Doctrine
A.

Introduction
There are several errors demonstrated in sections I and II, anyone of which

should justify relief from this Court. Assuming, arguendo, that this Court finds those
errors to have been individually harmless, Ms. Martinez asserts that the errors
combined amount to cumulative error.

The cumulative error doctrine speaks in terms

of the deprivation of fairness and due process throughout the course of proceedings,
and so can be accumulated across hearings. Ms. Martinez had a due process right at
her sentencing hearing. And, once the district court decided to hold a hearing on her
Rule 35 motion, she also had a right to due process in that hearing. Therefore, even if
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the errors established in sections I and II were harmless, the conglomeration of errors
should justify relief.

B.

The Cumulative Error Doctrine Should Apply To Sentencing And Rule 35
Hearings
The cumulative error doctrine deals with the defendant's right to due process.

See, e.g., State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694,723 (2009). That right extends throughout
the entire criminal prosecution, guaranteeing the entire process is fundamentally fair.
California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984). As noted in Section I(C) supra, the
sentencing hearing is part of the criminal process, and thus, must comply with the due
process protections.

Gardner, 430 U.S. at 358; Coutts, 101 Idaho at 117 n.10. And

since a Rule 35 motion for leniency asserts error in the sentencing decision, see
Huffman, 144 Idaho at 203, it should be considered part of the sentencing process, and
thus, part of the criminal prosecution, as several other courts have recognized?
See, e.g., United States v. Lightly, 616 F.3d 321, 371 (4th Cir. 2010); United

This is particularly true once the district court decides to hold a hearing. Once a
hearing has been deemed necessary, that hearing must comport with due process.
See, e.g., Tolman v. State, 128 Idaho 643,646 (Ct. App. 1996). The State ignores that
precedent, and again argues a misconstrued interpretation of State v. Coassolo,
136 Idaho 138 (2001). The State asserts that, because there is never a due process
right at issue in regard to a Rule 35 motion, no error therein could be accumulated.
(Resp. Br., at 14). Beside the fact that this is not a relinquishment of jurisdiction case,
which would make Coassolo inapplicable, Coassolo only holds that there is no due
process right to have a hearing when the district court decides to relinquish jurisdiction.
Coassolo, 136 Idaho at 143 ("The district judge may then, if the judge feels it necessary,
hold a hearing, but it is not constitutionally necessary.") However, since the district
court did hold a hearing in this case, the Coassolo analysis is inapplicable, and the
State's argument irrelevant to the issues now on appeal. Precedent remains clear:
once the district court decides to hold that hearing, the hearing must comport with due
process. See, e.g., Walton, 497 U.S. at 687; Tolman, 128 Idaho at 646. A deprivation of
that right demands a remedy. See Tolman, 128 Idaho at 646.
7
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States v. Santos, 369 Fed.Appx. 794, 797 (9th Cir. 2010); Gargle
1196,1223 (10th Cir. 2003); United States
(11th Cir. 2008); see Walton
grounds by Ring

V.

V.

V.

V.

Mallin, 317 F.3d

Lee, 268 Fed.Appx. 813, 816-17

Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 687 (1990), overruled on other

Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002) (reviewing a determination on a

motion for leniency for comport with the due process requirements); see also
State

V.

Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 462 (2002) (recognizing that due process requires "all

people charged with a crime must, so far as the law is concerned, 'stand on an equality
before the bar of justice in every American court.'" (quoting Griffin v. !fIinois, 351
U.S. 12,

17 (1956)) (emphasis added)).8

As such, the appropriate scope of

consideration in the cumulative error doctrine is whether the defendant was afforded a
fundamentally fair process throughout the criminal prosecution.

See, e.g., Severson,

147 Idaho at 723; see also Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 485.
The

accumulation

of errors

throughout

that

process

demonstrate

that

Ms. Martinez was not afforded a fundamentally fair process because she was not given
a full and fair opportunity to present evidence in support of her positions or to counter
the State's evidence.

That deprived her of her due process rights throughout the

criminal prosecution, and thus, the cumulative error doctrine would allow for a remedy in
the event that each of those errors was found individually harmless.

8 There is no exception for courts sitting in certain types of hearings; due process
extends to all hearings before a court of law. Strand, 137 Idaho at 462.
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CONCLUSION
Ms. Martinez respectfully requests that this Court vacate her sentence and
remand her case for further proceedings.
DATED this 3 rd day of December, 2012.

BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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